Concrete signature match: Trojan - Appears legitimate but performs malicious actions for VBScript platform, family PSRunner
Trojan:VBS/PSRunner!MSR is a concrete detection of a VBScript-based Trojan that extensively uses PowerShell and various Windows utilities (MSHTA, Regsvr32, Rundll32, BITS, Scheduled Tasks) for stealthy execution, persistence, and potential data exfiltration. Despite containing a string that suggests a 'demo attack scenario', its observed behaviors represent a sophisticated threat capable of significant system compromise.
Relevant strings associated with this threat: - powershell.exe -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Command cd /; (MACROHSTR_EXT) - You are about to run a demo attack scenario provided as part of the Microsoft WDATP Preview/Trial program (MACROHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForMshta.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.C!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.D!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.L!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.O!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForRegsvr32.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForRundll32.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - rundll32 (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForBITSJobs.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForPowerShell.G!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForScheduledTask.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForDataEncoding.D!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.J!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.K!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForRemoteFileCopy.B!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:ExecutionGuardrails (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForFileDeletion.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForHooking.M!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForNetshHelperDLL.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT) - !#HSTR:StringCodeForRemoteServices.A!pli (PEHSTR_EXT)
1e9c29d7af6011ca9d5609cb93b554965c61105a42df9fe0c36274e60db71b1dImmediately isolate the affected system to prevent further spread. Perform a full system scan, thoroughly investigate and remove all persistent artifacts and dropped payloads, and reset any compromised credentials. Confirm if the activity was part of an authorized Microsoft Defender ATP demo; if not, initiate a full incident response.